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THE SIGNIFICANCE (IF ANY) FOR THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ADVANCES IN LIE
DETECTOR TECHNOLOGY
Jeffrey Bellin*
Against a backdrop of accelerating developments in the science of lie
detection certain to reopen the debate on the reliability and therefore admissibility
of lie detector evidence in the federal courts, this Article examines whether the
prohibition on hearsay evidence (or other evidentiary objections) will preclude
admissibility of even scientifically reliable lie detector evidence. The Article
concludes that the hearsay prohibition, which has been largely ignored by courts
and commentators, is the primary obstacle to the future admission of scientifically
valid lie detector evidence. The Article also suggests a potential solution to the
hearsay problem that may allow admission of lie detector evidence in narrowly
defined circumstances.
Cross-examination is often described as the "'greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth,"' 1 but few would deny that it has achieved
this exalted status largely by default. Science has simply failed to produce any
valid alternative, leaving the criminal justice system to dutifully rely on this age-
old practice in the hope that it will enable juries to distinguish lies from truth.
Recent scientific advances herald the arrival of a more modern "engine" for
the discovery of truth-scientific lie detectors based on modern medical
technologies such as magnetic resonance imaging, i.e., brain scans. These
advances may constitute the first signs of a revolution in the criminal trial
system. If permitted by the courts, evidence developed through scientifically
valid lie detector examinations could become a ubiquitous legal tool that would
aid juries to evaluate witness credibility and permit defendants to conclusively
demonstrate their innocence (or guilt).
It is not clear, however, how courts will react to a scientifically valid lie
detector. For decades, so-called "lie detector" evidence has been barred in
federal and state courts on the ground that traditional lie detector technology is
unreliable, amounting to little more than junk science.2 Given the availability of
* Senior Appellate Attorney, California Courts of Appeal; former Assistant United States Attorney;
J.D., 1999, Stanford Law School. E-mail: jeffrey.bellin@gmail.com.
1. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE. EVIDENCE §
1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Results of a
polygraph are not admissible for the reason that the District Court gave-they are inherently
unreliable."). The Supreme Court has described the "common form of polygraph test" as one that:
measures a variety of physiological responses to a set of questions asked by the examiner,
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this facile response to any effort to place lie detector evidence before a jury,
courts have rarely gone beyond the reliability determination to evaluate
whether, once the science of lie detection improves, lie detector evidence will be
admissible. This Article attempts to undertake that analysis with respect to the
admissibility of scientifically valid lie detector evidence in the federal courts. 3 In
doing so, the Article notes a potentially devastating objection to lie detector
evidence that has been largely unaddressed by courts and commentators-that
lie detector evidence is inextricably intertwined with inadmissible hearsay. This
objection is particularly significant because if courts conclude that traditional
evidentiary principles, such as the prohibition of hearsay, preclude admissibility
of lie detector evidence, advances in lie detector technology will prove to be
largely irrelevant to the courts of law-ironically, the very setting where such
technology could have the greatest impact.
Part I of the Article examines the threshold "scientific validity"
requirements for the admission of expert testimony such as lie detector evidence,
set out in the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 5 It then discusses
recent scientific advances that signal that lie detector evidence may soon satisfy
these threshold requirements, eliminating the traditional barrier to the admission
of lie detector evidence in federal courts.
Part II examines three commonly cited evidentiary objections to lie detector
evidence that courts have relied on in addition to, or in concert with, an
objection to the underlying validity of lie detector science: (1) lie detector
evidence impermissibly invades the traditional province of the jury to evaluate
witness credibility, (2) it is barred under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it
is likely to "mislead" the jury, and (3) it violates Federal Rule of Evidence 704's
prohibition of expert testimony regarding the "ultimate issue." Part II concludes
that these objections are unlikely to constitute a continuing obstacle to the
admission of scientifically valid lie detector evidence. 6
who then interprets these physiological correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the
jury about whether the witness-often, as in this case, the accused-was deceptive in
answering questions about the very matters at issue in the trial.
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998).
3. Although this Article focuses primarily on the admissibility of lie detector evidence in federal
criminal trials, its analysis would apply equally to federal civil trials, where the evidentiary rules are
essentially identical, and to state court proceedings in jurisdictions with evidentiary rules that parallel
the federal rules.
4. 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (listing criteria that should be satisfied to establish that scientific
evidence is valid); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 n.9 (indicating that evidentiary reliability of scientific
evidence will be based on assessment of scientific validity).
6. As used throughout this Article, the phrase "scientifically valid" lie detector evidence refers
simply to lie detector evidence that has met the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 594-95 (noting that "overarching subject" of Rule 702 inquiry "is the scientific validity-
and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission" (emphasis added)).
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Part III analyzes the key remaining obstacle to the admission of
scientifically valid lie detector evidence-the prohibition against hearsay. The
hearsay problem arises because lie detector evidence consists of expert analysis
of out-of-court statements offered for their truth (i.e., hearsay) and is
consequently inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 absent an
applicable hearsay exception.7 Part III concludes that in almost all cases, the only
potentially applicable exception will be the residual hearsay exception found in
Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which although rarely utilized presents a
potentially viable (and perhaps the only viable) legal basis for admission of
scientifically valid lie detector evidence. Consequently, in Part IV, the Article
concludes that if modern advances in lie detector science are to have any impact
in the federal courts (or in the courts of the numerous states that have adopted
evidentiary rules analogous to the federal rules), 8 that impact will be funneled
through the narrow and relatively obscure gateway of Rule 807, with significant
consequences for future proponents of lie detector evidence.
I. SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES IN LIE DETECTION AND THE DAUBERTIRULE 702
THRESHOLD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The convergence of two trends has only recently created the potential for
widespread admissibility of lie detector evidence. The first of these trends is the
gradual recognition during the past two decades of the "'liberal thrust' of the
Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their 'general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony."' 9 The second trend is the sudden
and rapid evolution of lie detector technology. Both of these trends are briefly
summarized below.
A. Daubert and the "Liberal Thrust" of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The framework for the admissibility of lie detector evidence, like that of all
expert testimony, is set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
10
which provided the first definitive analysis of the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.11 In Daubert, the Supreme Court
explained that under Rule 702, "expert scientific testimony" is admissible if it
constitutes "(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue."
1 2
7. See infra Part III for a comprehensive analysis of the hearsay problem.
8. See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of
Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 836 n.36 (2008) (noting that "[florty-two states have
adopted rules of evidence patterned on the Federal Rules").
9. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-95; see also United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir.
1997) ("[Plolygraph examinations, like all other scientific evidence, must be subjected to the Rule 702
analysis set forth in Daubert.").
12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
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The "'scientific knowledge"' component of the Daubert analysis
"establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. '13 To ensure that evidence
meets this standard, a district court must conduct a "flexible" inquiry into the
scientific theory or technique that will be presented to the jury with reference to
at least five factors: (1) "whether [the] theory or technique ... can be (and has
been) tested," (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication," (3) "the known or potential rate of error" for that
theory or technique, (4) "the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
the technique's operation," and (5) whether the theory or technique has attained
"'general acceptance"' within the relevant scientific community. 14 The
"overarching subject" of the Daubert inquiry "is the scientific validity-and thus
the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission," 15 or, stated another way, an "assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue."16
In addition to meeting the threshold requirement of "scientific validity," an
expert's proffered testimony must also satisfy the second component of the
Daubert analysis, that it will "'assist the trier of fact.""' 17 This second component
represents a relatively minor evidentiary hurdle, however, because "[w]hether
evidence assists the trier of fact is essentially a relevance inquiry,"'1 8 a
requirement already imposed by Federal Rule of Evidence 402.19 In essence, this
second component of the Daubert inquiry states only an obvious point-that
even valid scientific evidence must be excluded if it is not relevant to the issues in
dispute.
The holding of Daubert has been incorporated into the amendments to Rule
702 enacted in 2000. Rule 702, as amended, permits a qualified expert to testify
in the form of an opinion if that testimony "will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and if: "(1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case."'20 In a lengthy annotation to the
rule that draws heavily from Daubert and the subsequent Supreme Court case of
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,21 the drafters emphasized that the new rule is
13. Id. at 590 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
14. Id. at 593-94; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (reiterating
that Daubert's "test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily
nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case" (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594)).
15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
16. Id. at 592-93.
17. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
18. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995); see also id. at 433 ("If polygraph
technique is a valid (even if not certain) measure of truthfulness, then there is no issue of relevance.").
19. See FED. R. EVID. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
20. FED. R. EVID. 702.
21. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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"broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the specific Daubert
factors where appropriate.
22
While largely derivative of preexisting case law, amended Rule 702
contributes to the analytical framework by rendering explicit what was, at most,
implicit in Daubert-that Rule 702's scientific validity analysis requires not only
an assessment of the reliability of the science (or technique) 23 behind the
proffered evidence as a general matter but also of the reliability of the
application of that science to the facts in dispute. As the drafters explained,
"[t]he amendment specifically provides that the trial court must scrutinize not
only the principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether those
principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts of the case."
24
B. Modern Lie Detector Evidence Under Rule 702
Measured against Rule 702's relatively permissive threshold for scientific
validity, lie detector evidence stands on the precipice of admissibility as
demonstrating sufficient scientific reliability for consideration by juries. Already,
in response to Daubert and its emphasis of "the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal
Rules," 25 most circuits have disavowed the pre-Daubert norm of a per se
exclusion of lie-detection evidence.26  All that remains for wide-scale
22. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note on 2000 amendment.
23. In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court held that "Daubert's general holding-setting forth the
trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific'
knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge." 526 U.S. at
141 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)).
Consequently, whether future lie detector experts are characterized as scientists, technicians, or
specialists, their testimony will be analyzed under the same framework.
24. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note on 2000 amendment. "'[A]ny step that renders
the analysis unreliable . . . renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step
completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that methodology."' Id. (quoting In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,745 (3d Cir. 1994)).
25. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)); see also Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395 (2d Cir.
2005) (recognizing that "[iut is a well-accepted principle that Rule 702 embodies a liberal standard of
admissibility for expert opinions, representing a departure from the previously widely followed, and
more restrictive, standard" (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588)).
26. See United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that "Daubert
framework" would be applied to determine admissibility of polygraph evidence in place of old general
application rule); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that per se rule
against admission of polygraph evidence under Rule 702 was effectively overruled by Daubert);
United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that "rationale underlying this circuit's
per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence did not survive Daubert"); United States v.
Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that per se exclusion of polygraph evidence is
"no longer warranted"); cf. United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that
Sixth Circuit never had per se ban of polygraph evidence); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206,
1224 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting Second Circuit has "intimated" that there is per se prohibition against
admission of polygraph evidence but affirming district court's ruling "[e]ven assuming that such test
results are not per se inadmissible"). But cf. United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cit.
2003) (noting that Daubert calls into question Fourth Circuit's per se prohibition on lie detector
evidence while affirming district court's application of ban because "only the en banc Court has the
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admissibility (under Rule 702) of expert lie detector testimony in federal court is
for the science of lie detection to move incrementally forward from its present
state and for these advances to be recognized by the relevant scientific
community. 27
There is reason to believe that lie detector technology is poised to make
substantial advances in the near future. After the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security provided "tens of
millions to hundreds of millions of dollars" in funding to scientists to develop
improved lie detector technologies.28 In the wake of this funding explosion, it has
been reported that there are over fifty laboratories in the United States alone
now dedicated to the detection of deception. 29
Among the most promising of the emerging new lie detection technologies
is Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("fMRI"), described as "a new kind
of lie detector that's more probing and accurate than the polygraph. '30 FMRI,
authority to consider whether, '[a]fter Daubert, a per se rule is not viable"' (quoting Posado, 57 F.3d at
433)).
With the exception of New Mexico, states that have specifically addressed the admissibility of
polygraph evidence have generally deemed it inadmissible. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-707 (LexisNexis
1994) ("[T]he opinion of a polygraph examiner may in the discretion of the trial judge be admitted as
evidence as to the truthfulness of any person called as a witness ...."); see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §
351.1 (West 1995) (prohibiting both "the results of a polygraph examination" and "the opinion of a
polygraph examiner" as evidence in any criminal proceeding absent stipulation); State v. Lyon, 744
P.2d 231, 231 (Or. 1987) ("[Plolygraph test results are inadmissible as evidence in the courts of this
state, even when admissibility has been stipulated by the parties.").
27. In fact, a handful of courts has already found that traditional lie detector techniques meet the
Daubert standard. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M. 1995) (concluding that
specific polygraph test offered by defendant was admissible under Daubert); United States v. Crumby,
895 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding "polygraph evidence" to be "sufficiently reliable
under Daubert to be admitted as scientific evidence under [Rule] 702"); Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291,
304 (N.M. 2004) (holding that control question polygraph technique satisfies Daubert test).
28. Jeffrey Kluger & Coco Masters, How to Spot a Liar, TIME, Aug. 28, 2006, at 46, 46; accord
Steve Silberman, Don't Even Think About Lying, WIRED, Jan. 2006, at 142, 147 (discussing post-2001
Department of Defense- and Homeland Security-funded lie detection technology research).
29. Silberman, supra note 28, at 147.
30. Id. at 142; accord Andre A. Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting - Can It Be Used to Detect the
Innocence of Persons Charged with a Crime?, 70 UMKC L. REv. 891, 920 (2002) (describing potential
uses of brain scan technology to detect innocent defendants and contending that this technology
satisfies Daubert prerequisites "albeit marginally"); Harvey Rishikof & Patrick Bratton, 11/9-9/11: The
Brave New World Order: Peace Through Law-Beyond Power Politics or Peace Through Empire-
Rationale Strategy and Reasonable Policy, 50 VILL. L. REv. 655, 679-80 (2005) (noting that "[t]he past
decade has seen revolutions both in brain-scanning technologies and in drugs that affect the brain's
functions" and commenting that "by comparing [brain scan] images ...a computer can produce
detailed pictures of the part of the brain answering or not answering the question-in essence, creating
a kind of high-tech lie detector" and that "[i]t now appears that there are safe drugs that reduce
conversational inhibitions and the urge to deceive"). See also Ronald Kotulak, Lips Can Lie, but Your
Brain Will Spill the Beans, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 2004. § 1, at 1 (noting that fMRI technology may be
substantially more accurate than polygraph); Dennis O'Brien, What a Lie Looks Like: Scanning for
Truth, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2006, at 1C (noting that several companies view fMRI as more accurate
than polygraph); Malcolm Ritter, Brain Scans Detect Lying, Could Replace Polygraphs, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2006, at 3E (referencing advocates who claim that fMRI may be more
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which, as its name suggests, is based on the same technology as magnetic
resonance imaging ("MRI") devices commonly available in hospitals, uses
magnetic fields to image brain activity.31 In theory, an expert applying this
technology can distinguish lies from truth by questioning a subject while he or
she undergoes an fMRI scan. 32 During the questioning, the expert can note
whether the subject's brain exhibits activity in areas associated with lying or
those associated with telling the truth.33 As these brain activities will be more
difficult to suppress than typical stress reactions measured by traditional
polygraph examinations, new technologies like fMRI show great promise for the
development of scientifically valid lie detectors.34 Already, companies are
moving to market fMRI technology to criminal defendants eager to prove their
innocence. 35
The infusion of money and energy into the science of lie detection coupled
with the pace of recent developments in that science suggest that it is only a
matter of time before lie detector evidence meets the Daubert threshold for
scientific validity. 36 As noted at the outset of this Article, when this occurs,
courts will be required to determine whether traditional evidentiary principles
nevertheless bar even such scientifically valid lie detector evidence. In essence,
then, advances in the science of lie detection signal the beginning rather than the
end of the debate about the use of lie detector evidence in the courts.
1I. CLEARING THE UNDERBRUSH: THE DIMINISHING VITALITY OF THE MOST
COMMON ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIONS TO LIE DETECTOR EVIDENCE
Satisfaction of the threshold requirements imposed by Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.37 and Rule 702 will certainly be a significant step for
lie detector evidence, but it will not answer the ultimate question of the
accurate than polygraphs). For a more comprehensive description of the techniques involved in
imaging deception in the brain, see Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal
Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509,525 (2006).
31. See Keckler, supra note 30, at 526 (describing operation of fMRI).
32. Kluger & Masters, supra note 28, at 47; Silberman, supra note 28, at 142-45.
33. Kluger & Masters, supra note 28, at 47; Silberman, supra note 28, at 142-45.
34. See Marc Ramirez, It's Election Day: Got Your Truth Meter?, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006,
at F1 ("The fMRI scanner . . . would appear to be to the polygraph what IBM's Deep Blue
supercomputer is to a battery-operated, handheld chess game .... "); Silberman, supra note 28, at 144
(detailing how fMRI scan can indicate when person is telling the truth or lying). Other new
technologies have also shown promise for lie detection, such as electroencephalograms, which measure
electric activity emitted by the brain; eye scans; analysis of microexpressions (i.e., "tells"); and, of
course, further development of traditional polygraph techniques. See Keckler, supra note 30, at 519
(describing potential of electroencephalogram technology as alternative to MRI technology to detect
deception); Kluger & Masters, supra note 28, at 47 (reporting on advances in electroencephalogram
technology, eye scan, and microexpression analysis in detecting deception).
35. Silberman, supra note 28, at 147.
36. See Silberman, supra note 28, at 147, 150 (noting advances in lie detector technology that
Scott Faro, radiologist conducting studies comparing new lie detection technology to polygraphs,
predicts will "change the entire judicial system").
37. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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admissibility of that evidence. While courts have primarily relied on concerns
about the validity of the underlying science to exclude lie detector evidence, they
have also recognized a number of alternative objections. Among these are that
the lie detector expert will usurp the jury's role as arbiter of witness credibility
and that certain lie detector expert testimony violates the "ultimate issue"
prohibition of Rule 704.38 As discussed below, these objections to lie detector
evidence are based on questionable legal premises and will fail to have any
ongoing validity once lie detector evidence passes the Daubert/Rule 702
threshold.
A. Objections to Lie Detector Evidence Based on a Perceived Invasion of the
Province of the Jury to Assess Witness Credibility
The objection that lie detector evidence invades the province of the jury has
two principal variations. Both of these variations are unlikely to serve as
significant obstacles to the admission of scientifically valid lie detector evidence.
1. The Undue Influence of the Scheffer Plurality Opinion
The most basic form of the objection to lie detector evidence as invading
the province of the jury is that expert testimony relating to the credibility of a
particular witness statement violates "[a] fundamental premise of our criminal
trial system . . . that 'the jury is the lie detector."' 39 Courts relying on this
objection generally cite Justice Thomas's lead opinion in United States v.
Scheffer,40 a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the President's
constitutional authority to impose a blanket exclusion of polygraph evidence in
military trials.41 As Justice Thomas explained in Scheffer, "a polygraph expert
can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about
whether the witness was telling the truth. ' 42 Consequently, the objection goes, lie
detector expert testimony has no evidentiary value because it serves only to
duplicate a function already ably performed by, and exclusively committed to,
the jury.43
38. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1998) (plurality opinion) (noting that lie
detector evidence "diminish[es]" juries' role as mechanism by which credibility is assessed); United
States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that Rule 704(b) prohibits inclusion of
testimony from polygraph expert that speaks to whether criminal defendant had culpable mental
state).
39. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907,
912 (9th Cir. 1973)).
40. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
41. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312.
42. Id. at 313 (plurality opinion).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding polygraph evidence under Rule 403 because, inter alia, such
testimony "usurps a critical function of the jury and because it is not helpful to the jury, which is
capable of making its own determination regarding credibility"). See infra note 44 for a list of
additional cases rejecting lie detector evidence out of deference to the jury's role.
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While perhaps rhetorically compelling, the "jury is the lie detector"
objection rests on a shaky legal foundation. As an initial matter, courts misstep
when relying on Scheffer itself to support the proposition. Although regularly
overlooked,44 the portion of Justice Thomas's opinion citing the jury's exclusive
role as lie detector did not garner a majority and thus does not have precedential
effect.45 Further, and equally significant, a careful reading of Justice Thomas's
opinion reveals that it does not state that the jury's role as exclusive lie detector
is a legal ground for exclusion of lie detector evidence.4 6 Rather Justice Thomas
makes a much narrower point-that a concern that polygraph evidence would
erode the jury's role as primary or exclusive lie detector was a valid (i.e., not
arbitrary) basis on which a policy maker could exclude such testimony.47
The relevant policy-making body with respect to the admission of evidence
in federal (nonmilitary) trials-the United States Congress4 -has not taken the
44. See United States v. Moran, 69 F. App'x 398, 398 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Scheffer for
proposition that "assigning the appropriate weight and credibility to otherwise admissible witness
testimony is exclusively a task for the jury" (citing Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion)));
United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2001) ("As Justice Thomas's majority [sic] opinion in
Scheffer noted, '[a] fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that "the jury is the lie
detector."' (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion))); United States v. Waters, 194 F.3d
926, 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[i]n Scheffer, the Supreme Court noted the legitimate 'risk that
juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific
expertise"' (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313-14 (plurality opinion))); King v. Trippett, 192 F.3d 517,
524 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Scheffer observed that a per se exclusion of polygraph
evidence actually preserves 'the [court members'] core function of making credibility determinations in
criminal trials."' (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312-13 (plurality opinion))).
45. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds....' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))); Positive Software
Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278,282 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that plurality
opinion was not binding precedent except to extent majority of Justices concurred in reasoning), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2943 (2007). The jury as exclusive "lie detector" portion of the Scheffer opinion was
joined by only three other Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia and Souter.
See Morris v. Burnett, 319 F.3d 1254, 1275 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that rationale that jury is
exclusive lie detector "did not muster majority support" in Scheffer). Justice Thomas's reliance on this
rationale was, in fact, specifically criticized by two Justices. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 318 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part) (agreeing with dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens that "the principal opinion
overreaches when it rests its holding on the additional ground that the jury's role in making credibility
determinations is diminished when it hears polygraph evidence").
46. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313-14 (expressing potential for polygraph evidence to diminish role
of jury in determination of credibility).
47. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312, 314 (plurality opinion) (reasoning that concern over erosion of
jury's role in determining credibility is "a ... legitimate governmental interest" and consequently
supports conclusion that "the President is within his constitutional prerogative to promulgate a per se
rule that simply excludes all such evidence"); id. at 308 ("[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials" and such a
rule would "not abridge an accused's fight to present a defense so long as [it was] not 'arbitrary' or
'disproportionate to the purposes [it was] designed to serve' (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
56 (1987))).
48. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (recognizing role of Congress as ultimate
authority for promulgation of Federal Rules of Evidence).
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step of barring lie detector evidence. Consequently, judges, who are not
authorized to alter the federal rules unilaterally, cannot properly exclude
otherwise admissible evidence based on a preference for the jury's traditional
role as exclusive "lie detector.
49
In sum, any per se exclusion of lie detector evidence on the ground that it
interferes with the jury's traditional function must be backed, as in Scheffer, by
an applicable statute or rule of evidence promulgated by the appropriate policy-
making body. As there is no such rule or statute currently applicable to the
federal district courts, the jury's traditional role as arbiter of witness credibility is
not a valid basis for exclusion of lie detector evidence.
2. Application of Rule 403 to Protect the Jury from Being Overwhelmed
by Lie Detector Evidence
Separate and apart from the undue influence exhibited by Justice Thomas's
contention in Scheffer that the jury is the one, true lie detector, courts have
relied on a second, related concern also present in Justice Thomas's analysis to
exclude lie detector evidence: that the opinion of a lie detector expert is
inadmissible because "the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can
lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt. '50 As one court
summarizes, "[p]olygraph evidence has an 'overwhelming potential for
prejudice,"' 51 due to "its questionable reliability and its 'misleading appearance
of accuracy."' 52 Relying on these concerns, courts have applied Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 to exclude lie detector evidence on the ground that its "probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
49. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,620 (1997) ("Courts are not free to amend
a rule outside the process Congress ordered ...."). The contention that the presentation of expert
evidence regarding witness credibility impermissibly infringes on the jury's role is further undermined
by numerous widely accepted aspects of federal trials designed to influence the jury's credibility
determinations, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 608, which permits a party to present evidence
"concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness," FED. R. EvID. 608; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Lollar, 606 F.2d 587,589 (5th Cir. 1979) (determining under Rule 608 that prosecution
witness could impeach defendant's testimony by testifying that defendant was generally not
believable), and the numerous standard witness credibility jury instructions, see, e.g., United States v.
Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1574 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting claim of error with respect to
instructions on basis that jury was properly instructed with respect to witness credibility where "the
district court judge gave a number of instructions dealing specifically with credibility" that "listed a
number of factors the jury could consider in determining the credibility of witnesses" along with
"special instructions to aid the jury in assessing the credibility of informants, accomplices, and
immunized witnesses"); see also United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
"trend in recent years to allow" expert testimony regarding general credibility of eyewitness
testimony).
50. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 314 (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349,
1360 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasizing "the polygraph's misleading reputation as a 'truth teller"' in
upholding exclusion).
51. United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d
1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)).
52. Id. (quoting United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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the issues, or misleading the jury."53
Whatever the merits of these rulings (which appear to be grounded more in
psychology than in law), a general Rule 403-based exclusion of lie detector
evidence loses its vitality once that evidence has passed the Daubert/Rule 702
threshold. A Rule 403-based exclusion of lie detector evidence depends on an
underlying assumption that the proffered evidence is scientifically invalid and
thus unreliable. It is only that perceived unreliability of lie detector science that
renders the evidence, when cloaked in expert testimony, misleading and thus
susceptible to exclusion under Rule 403.
51
Once the assumption that lie detector science is generally unreliable is
eliminated (as it must be for the evidence to pass the Daubert/Rule 702
threshold), the potential for misleading the jury is drastically reduced. The
residual danger that the jury will be misled or confused by a particular lie
detector expert is then indistinguishable from that present with other scientific
expert testimony routinely admitted in court, such as expert DNA or fingerprint
analysis. This residual danger is properly dealt with, as in other contexts, through
the adversarial process itself, not by outright preclusion of the evidence. As the
Supreme Court in Daubert emphasized, "[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence .... These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion ...
are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the
standards of Rule 702."
55
53. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir.
2004) (affirming exclusion of lie detector evidence because, given "significance of [the proffered lie
detector evidence] to the case" and persuasive power of polygraph testimony, "evidence was properly
excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403"); United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 844 (7th Cir.
1999) (upholding trial court's exclusion of "even the threshold question as to whether a polygraph test
had been administered" under Rule 403 on ground that question "would confuse and cause
speculation among the jury"); United States v. Waters, 194 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming
district court's exclusion of polygraph evidence on grounds that evidence would "go to a collateral
matter and cause confusion as to the weight of the evidence"); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402,
1406 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's exclusion of polygraph evidence under Rule 403
because, inter alia, there is "danger that the jury may overvalue polygraph results as an indicator of
truthfulness because of the polygraph's scientific nature"); Miller, 874 F.2d at 1261 (finding that
polygraphs are generally inadmissible except in rare circumstances because they will likely cause
prejudice).
54. See Miller, 874 F.2d at 1261 (justifying general exclusion of polygraph evidence because of
"its questionable reliability and its 'misleading appearance of accuracy"' (quoting Falsia, 724 F.2d at
1342)).
55. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44, 61 (1987)); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 (rejecting argument that hypnotically refreshed
testimony would mislead jury because "a jury can be educated to the risks of hypnosis through expert
testimony and cautionary instructions"); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1983) ("[Tihe
truthfinding process is better served if the witness's testimony is submitted to 'the crucible of the
judicial process so that the factfinder may consider it, after cross-examination, together with the other
evidence in the case to determine where the truth lies."' (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
440 (1976) (White, J., concurring))); United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1079 (5th Cir.
1996) ("The perceived flaws in the testimony of [the] experts are matters properly to be tested in the
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In addition, a Rule 403-based exclusion intended to protect the jury from its
perceived ignorance is a relic of a receding era when judges could comfortably
announce that while they were immune to its spell, jurors-even after the
presentation of competing expert testimony, cross-examination, and appropriate
limiting instructions-would likely be overwhelmed by the power of lie detector
evidence. 56 In the words of the New Mexico Supreme Court:
"Universality of education and the almost instantaneous dispersal of
information through modern technology have created a citizenry with a
remarkable and historically unique breadth of knowledge, perception,
and sophistication.... Excluding information on the ground that jurors
are too ignorant or emotional to evaluate it properly may have been
appropriate in England at a time when a rigid class society created a
yawning gap between royal judges and commoner jurors, but it is
inconsistent with the realities of our modern American informed
society and the responsibilities of independent thought in a working
democracy." 57
In sum, exclusion of lie detector evidence under Rule 403 based on fears
that the science of lie detection is unreliable (and thus misleading) is, at best,
crucible of adversarial proceedings; they are not the basis for truncating that process."); United States
v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 895-96 (D.N.M. 1995) (recognizing that because polygraph expert would
"testify that the technique is not infallible," that studies had shown that juries are "cautious and
careful in assessing polygraph evidence," and that government would be able to cross-examine expert
and present its own expert testimony, probative value of expert's testimony was not substantially
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's
note on 2000 amendment ("'[T]he trial court's role as gatekeeper [for expert opinion testimony] is not
intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system."' (quoting 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at
1078)).
56. There is an empirical debate regarding whether juries are, in fact, unduly swayed by lie
detector evidence, see Ronald J. Simon, Adopting a Military Approach to Polygraph Evidence
Admissibility: Why Federal Evidentiary Protections Will Suffice, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1055, 1077
(1994) (summarizing studies indicating that juries do not give excessive weight to polygraph testimony
despite traditional perspective of courts that juries will too easily defer to polygraph results).
Unfortunately, this debate is largely unhelpful to the analysis because there is no objective measure
for determining how much weight a juror should give to lie detector evidence. As with all evidence,
the proper weight to give any particular piece of lie detector evidence depends on the circumstances. If
a scientifically valid lie detector test reveals that a key witness is (or is not) telling the truth and that
testimony is consistent with other evidence, the jury would properly give the lie detector evidence
significant weight. On the contrary, if the lie detector expert's testimony is undermined on cross-
examination and refuted by other evidence, the jury would properly give it little weight.
57. Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 297 (N.M. 2004) (quoting 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, at xix (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2003));
accord United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 318-19 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
(concluding that argument that jury will be unable to properly weigh lie detector evidence "demeans
and mistakes the role and competence of jurors in deciding the factual question of guilt or
innocence"); id. at 337 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he reliance on a fear that the average jury is not
able to assess the weight of this testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of
the average American."); People v. Johnson, 109 Cal. Rptr. 118, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (Garner, J.,
dissenting) ("Today it takes a certain effrontery, a certain intellectual arrogance, a certain intellectual
snobbery, to say to a juror, 'You cannot hear this evidence because you are not capable of effectively
evaluating it."').
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superfluous given that exclusion on this basis would already be required under
Rule 702 and, at worst, a direct violation of Rule 702 and Daubert. As discussed
above, Daubert's Rule 702 analysis is specifically intended to answer the
objection that proffered scientific evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be
presented to the jury.58 Further, under Daubert, the scientific reliability
determination must be made by reference to the opinions of experts in the
relevant field, not a particular judge's own gut-level predilections about the
science involved. 59 Thus, once the scientific validity objection is answered in
favor of the proffered evidence under Rule 702, the analysis cannot be subtly
revisited and countermanded under Rule 403.60
Finally, it bears emphasis that a district court considering reliance on Rule
403 to exclude scientifically valid lie detector evidence offered by a defendant in a
criminal case must weigh competing constitutional concerns. "Few rights are
more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own
defense," 61 and it is widely accepted that in doing so a defendant enjoys broad
latitude "to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of
guilt. ' 62 Given these well-established postulates, it will be difficult to argue that
exclusion of exculpatory scientifically valid lie detector evidence is constitutional
if the sole, and somewhat speculative, ground for exclusion is that the evidence
58. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 n.9 ("In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary
reliability will be based upon scientific validity."); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
152 (1999) ("The objective of [Daubert's gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the reliability and
relevancy of expert testimony.").
59. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (noting that judges should rely on peer review of experts to
assess expert's credibility).
60. This is not to say that Rule 403 should play no role in determining the admissibility of
scientifically valid lie detector evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (emphasizing that judge should
"be mindful of other applicable rules" including Rule 403 in weighing admissibility of expert
testimony); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[Elven if polygraph evidence
should satisfy Rule 702, it must still survive the rigors of Rule 403 .... " (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at
595)). Rule 403 can properly be applied to limit and shape a particular presentation of lie detector
evidence (for example, by limiting the expert's testimony to those questions and answers during the lie
detector examination that are relevant and not ambiguous or otherwise misleading). Further, Rule 403
will also have utility in excluding particular lie detector applications, without the necessity of a full
Daubert hearing, where flaws in the application are apparent without reference to the underlying
science (for example, where the test is administered by an unqualified person). See infra Part III.D for
discussion of Rule 403's impact on admissibility. See United States v. Benavidez-Benavidez, 217 F.3d
720, 724 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that Daubert hearing is not required every time lie detector
evidence is offered because "district courts are free to reject the admission of polygraph evidence on
the basis of any applicable rule of evidence"); cf. United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. 1199,
1208 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (excluding polygraph evidence under Rule 403 because "[t]he flawed
examination here creates a substantial possibility the jury would be misled" (emphasis added)), affd,
194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
61. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (recognizing that accused "must comply
with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence," but holding that defendant's constitutional rights were violated
when critical testimony that "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" was excluded by trial
court).
62. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
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could potentially "mislead" the jury under Rule 403.63
B. Lie Detector Evidence and the "Ultimate Issue" Prohibition of Rule 704
Courts have also ruled that expert testimony regarding certain lie detector
results is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) because the
testimony encompasses the "ultimate issue." 64 As explained below, this
objection, even if valid, is narrow in scope and consequently should not prove to
be a significant obstacle to the future admission of lie detector evidence.
As originally drafted, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 was intended to abolish
the common law doctrine that prohibited testimony on the "ultimate issue," a
prohibition deemed by the drafters of the rule to be "unduly restrictive, difficult
of application, and generally serv[ing] only to deprive the trier of fact of useful
information. ' 65 In 1984, after a mentally disturbed individual attempted to
assassinate President Reagan and a deranged fan murdered John Lennon,
Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,66 which, among other
things, added a new subsection to Rule 704 in order to "constrain psychiatric
testimony on behalf of defendants asserting the insanity defense. ' 67 The added
subsection of Rule 704 states in full that:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
63. Cf United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 221 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing constitutional limits
on district court's exercise of discretion under Rule 403), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 197 (2006).
64. The Rule 704 basis for exclusion of lie detector testimony has appeared in two Ninth Circuit
opinions that affirmed district court rulings excluding proffered lie detector evidence under Rule
704(b) without conducting Daubert hearings. United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Crumby, 895 F.
Supp. 1354, 1362 (D. Ariz. 1995) (limiting polygraph expert's testimony, in part, based on "well-
founded" argument that "polygraph evidence is prejudicial because it is evidence of the ultimate issue
in the case").
65. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee announced
(prematurely) in the comments to the Rule that by virtue of Rule 704, "the so-called 'ultimate issue'
rule is specifically abolished." Id. The Committee added that: "The basis usually assigned for the rule,
to prevent the witness from 'usurping the [functions] of the jury,' is aptly characterized as 'empty
rhetoric.' Id. (quoting 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1920, at
18 (Chadbourn rev. 1978)).
66. Pub. L. No. 94-473, ch. 4, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (2000
& Supp. V 2005)).
67. United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 588 (4th Cir. 1994); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at
230 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412 ("Under this proposal, expert psychiatric
testimony would be limited to presenting and explaining their diagnoses, such as whether the
defendant had a severe mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such a disease or
defect, if any, may have been."); H.R. REP. No. 98-577, at 16 (1983) ("While the medical and
psychological knowledge of expert witnesses may well provide data that will assist the jury in
determining the existence of the [insanity] defense, no person can be said to have expertise regarding
the legal and moral decision involved.").
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alone. 68
Despite arguments to the contrary, a number of circuits have interpreted
Rule 704(b) to extend beyond the testimony of psychiatric or mental health
experts "to all expert witnesses." 69 The Ninth Circuit has subsequently applied
this prohibition in two cases in which polygraph experts intended to testify with
respect to the defendants' answers to questions that indicated the absence of
criminal intent.
70
Even assuming that Rule 704(b) properly applies to the testimony of all
experts, proponents of lie detector expert testimony should have little difficulty
avoiding its prohibitions, for a variety of reasons. First, the vast majority of lie
detector evidence will not pertain to the "mental state or condition" of the
defendant and consequently will not trigger the application of Rule 704(b).
Rather, the more common use of lie detector evidence will be to establish the
credibility of statements regarding objective facts-for example, a defendant's
statement that he was not present at the scene of the crime or that he did not
engage in a physical act that forms the basis of the crime charged.
71
Second, even where the dispute at trial revolves around an issue of intent-
such as whether a killing was premeditated or committed in self-defense-lie
detector evidence can be introduced without any direct inquiry into a "mental
state or condition." A defendant can disprove his intent in the same manner the
prosecutor will try to prove it-circumstantially. 72 The questioning presented
68. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
69. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The language of Rule 704(b)
is perfectly plain. It does not limit its reach to psychiatrists and other mental health experts. Its reach
extends to all expert witnesses."); see also, e.g., United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1388 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("Although the Rule was originally enacted to place a limitation on psychiatric testimony when
a criminal defendant relies upon the insanity defense, it is now well-established that Rule 704(b)
applies to all cases in which an expert testifies as to a mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or defense thereto." (citation omitted)); United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d
576, 580 (7th Cir. 1986) (ruling that Congress intended Rule 704(b) to exclude all expert testimony
about defendant's ultimate mental state when it would be relevant to proving legal conclusion). But
see Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d at 588 ("Rule 704(b) was.. . an attempt to constrain psychiatric testimony on
behalf of defendants asserting the insanity defense. The application of the same rule in an entirely
different context ... is murky at best." (citation omitted)); United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236,
1242 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he most sensible way to read [Rule 704(b)], in light of its terms and the
purpose of the rule, is as referring to testimony based on a 'psychiatric' or similar 'medical' analysis of
the defendant's mental processes."); United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 855 n.6 (10th Cir. 1992)
("The legislative history suggests that Congress only intended to limit 'the scope of expert testimony
by psychiatrists and other mental health experts."' (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3412)).
70. Booth, 309 F.3d at 573; Campos, 217 F.3d at 710; see also United States v. Ramirez-Robles,
386 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Rule 704(b) as alternative justification for excluding portion
of proffered lie detector evidence).
71. See, e.g., Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d at 1245 nn.3-4 (finding that in prosecution for sale of
methamphetamine, Rule 704 excluded question of whether defendant knew there would be a sale of
drugs but did not exclude two other questions that were factually based).
72. See United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that because "[d]irect
evidence of a defendant's mental state frequently is unavailable" government may and "often does
prove a defendant's criminal intent with circumstantial evidence").
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from the lie detector examination will, again, solely concern objective facts, but
in this case, those facts will be offered to disprove the requisite criminal intent.
For example, if the defense seeks to prove that the defendant acted in self-
defense, there is no need for the expert to inquire directly as to the defendant's
"intent." Rather the expert could ask whether the victim had a weapon, whether
the victim threatened to kill the defendant, who struck the first blow, and so
on.73 By showing the absence of criminal intent solely through circumstantial
evidence of objective facts, the expert's testimony avoids any conflict with Rule
704(b). 74
Third, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's analysis, a lie detector expert can, in
fact, testify with respect to the veracity of a defendant's answer to an inquiry as
to intent without violating the ultimate issue prohibition of Rule 704(b). 75 This is
because there is a distinction between an expert's opinion that the defendant
truthfully stated he acted with a certain intent (e.g., in self-defense), and the
expert's (perhaps prohibited) opinion that the defendant did, in fact, act with
that intent. As the Ninth Circuit itself has explained in another context, the
prohibition in Rule 704(b):
does not bar testimony supporting an inference or conclusion that a
defendant does or does not have the requisite mental state, "so long as
the expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the
jury and the ultimate inference or conclusion does not necessarily
follow from the testimony. '76
Even the most sophisticated lie detector technology will not enable an
expert to testify as to a defendant's past intent. Instead, the most an expert can
73. See United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1165 (2d. Cir. 1993) ("Clearly, Rule 704(b)
does not prohibit all expert testimony that gives rise to an inference concerning a defendant's mental
state. The plain language of the rule, however, means that the expert cannot expressly 'state the
inference,' but must leave the inference, however obvious, for the jury to draw." (citation omitted)).
74. See Booth, 309 F.3d at 573 (affirming district court's exclusion of testimony of polygraph
expert that defendant "was being truthful when he denied intent to defraud or knowledge of fraud");
Campos, 217 F.3d at 710 (affirming district court's exclusion of polygraph examination consisting of
question "did you know there were drugs in the van?").
75. The Ninth Circuit itself has recognized the difficulty in distinguishing prohibited from
permissible testimony under its jurisprudence. See United States v. Gonzales, 307 F.3d 906, 911 (9th
Cir. 2002) (recognizing in discussing Campos decision that "[i]t is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between an expert opinion that would necessarily lead to the finding of a particular intent and an
opinion that only comes close to this forbidden effect").
76. United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 309 (3d
Cir. 2001) ("Rule 704(b) may be violated when the prosecutor's question is plainly designed to elicit
the expert's testimony about the mental state of the defendant or when the expert triggers the
application of Rule 704(b) by directly referring to the defendant's intent, mental state, or mens rea.
Rule 704 prohibits 'testimony from which it necessarily follows, if the testimony is credited, that the
defendant did or did not possess the requisite mens rea."' (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998))); DiDomenico, 985 F.2d at 1164 (observing that Rule 704(b)
"disables even an expert from 'expressly stating the final conclusion or inference as to a defendant's
actual mental state' at the time of a crime" (quoting United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854 (10th
Cir. 1992))).
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say is that when the defendant voiced an innocent intent, lie detector technology
indicated that the defendant was truthful. The ultimate issue of the defendant's
intent does not "necessarily follow" from this testimony.77 Rather, as the
prosecution will no doubt argue, the test could be flawed, or the defendant may
have "fooled" the test or deluded himself, and thus, even if the expert's
testimony regarding the test is credited, the jury could still conclude that the
defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent.78
Thus, the exceedingly narrow significance of Rule 704(b) in the lie detector
context is, at most, that a lie detector expert is not permitted to testify directly as
to the veracity of a defendant's response to a question such as, "what was your
intent?" And, as discussed above, even the exclusion of that testimony under the
rule is legally questionable.
III. THE HEARSAY OBJECTION TO LIE DETECTOR EVIDENCE AND A POTENTIAL
SOLUTION TO THE HEARSAY PROBLEM: THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULES
The most cogent evidentiary objection to scientifically valid expert lie
detector testimony is that it is hearsay. This is because any proffer of lie detector
evidence will include two distinct elements: (1) an out-of-court statement by the
defendant or another witness, and (2) expert testimony that the out-of-court
statement is true. Central to the proffer, then, is an out-of-court statement that
gives every appearance of being offered for its truth-i.e., hearsay.79 In fact,
77. Younger, 398 F.3d at 1189 (citing Morales, 108 F.3d at 1038).
78. Cf id. (finding no violation of Rule 704(b) in police lieutenant expert testimony about
hypothetical "person" or "individual" while expressly denying knowledge of defendant); Gonzales,
307 F.3d at 911 (determining that expert's testimony that "a 'person' possessing the evidence in
question would, in fact, possess the drugs for the purpose of distributing" was permissible under Rule
704(b) because "[e]ven if the jury believed the expert's testimony, the jury could have concluded that
[the defendant] was not a typical or representative person, who possessed the drugs and drug
paraphernalia involved"); United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no error in
admission of testimony over Rule 704(b) objection where "[tihe expert's answers to the four questions
posed by the government did not contain an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition" at issue but "[ilnstead ... focused on whether facts similar
to those in evidence were consistent with the conduct of a hypothetical person suffering a severe manic
episode").
79. The Supreme Court of Canada has short-circuited the entire lie detector controversy in
Canadian courts by ruling that, regardless of advances in the science of lie detection, such evidence is
inadmissible in criminal cases based on traditional evidentiary objections, including an analogue to the
federal rules prohibiting hearsay. Compare R. v. B6land, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398, 410-11, 416-17 (Can.)
(reasoning that lie detector evidence is inadmissible because its admission "would run counter to the
well established [Canadian] rules of evidence," including, primarily, prohibition on bolstering witness
credibility by prior consistent statements absent allegation of recent fabrication), with FED. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(B) (excepting from hearsay rules prior statement of testifying witness "offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive"). The Canadian court also emphasized that the admission of such evidence "serve[s] no
purpose which is not already served" as jurors need no expert assistance in determining witness
credibility, and lie detector evidence "will disrupt proceedings, cause delays, and lead to numerous
complications which will result in no greater degree of certainty in the process than that which already
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considering that a simple hearsay objection has the potential to render the entire
debate regarding the scientific reliability of lie detector evidence (past and
present) moot, it is surprising how little analysis has been devoted to the
subject.80
A. Lie Detector Evidence Depends on Hearsay for Its Relevance
The Federal Rules of Evidence define "hearsay" as a "statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'8' Such statements are
inadmissible in federal (and state) court absent an applicable exception to the
hearsay rules.8 2
The hearsay problem arises in virtually any presentation of lie detector
evidence due to the fact that all such evidence depends for its relevance on an
effort to prove the truth of an underlying out-of-court witness statement. This
problem is readily apparent when a defendant attempts to introduce an
exculpatory statement through a lie detector expert-significantly, the very
scenario where lie detection could provide the greatest service to the criminal
exists." Beland, 2 S.C.R. at 417. Unlike the rulings of American courts, the Canadian ruling "is not
based on fear of inaccuracies"; instead, the court noted that "even the finding of a significant
percentage of errors in its results would not, by itself, be sufficient ground to exclude [the polygraph]
as an instrument for use in the courts." Id. at 416-17.
80. Commentators have either failed to squarely address the hearsay problem, see generally, e.g.,
Ronald J. Simon, Adopting a Military Approach to Polygraph Evidence Admissibility: Why Federal
Evidentiary Protections Will Suffice, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1055 (1994) (failing to address issue of
hearsay); John C. Bush, Note, Warping the Rules: How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary
Rules to Exclude Polygraph Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539 (2006) (contending that federal courts
improperly warp general evidentiary rules to exclude polygraph evidence, while briefly noting that
hearsay rules present no problem for polygraph evidence as long as test results are not offered to
prove truth of matter asserted); David Gallai, Note, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts: Should It
Be Admissible?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (1999) (examining admissibility of polygraph examinations
under Daubert and rules of evidence but neglecting to address hearsay objection); Timothy B.
Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of
Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1247 (1997) (arguing for rejection of
polygraph evidence on various grounds, but declining to include hearsay rules as obstacle to its
admission), or asserted that hearsay is not an obstacle based on arcane or questionable (see discussion
in text, infra) legal theories, see Edward J. Imwinkelried & James R. McCall, Issues Once Moot: The
Other Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1071, 1073 (1997) (contending that statements of polygraph subject are not
hearsay because (1) subject's "answers are the verbal part of a relevant act," the polygrapher's
examination, and (2) "Rule 703 would override the hearsay doctrine and permit the polygraphist to
express an opinion based in part on the subject's responses"); see also Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 753 N.E.2d
649, 654 (Ind. 2001) (citing Imwinkelried & McCall, supra, to support exclusion of lie detector
evidence on hearsay grounds); James R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph
Evidence, or Even if the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit the Results?, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
925, 934 & n.37 (1998) (stating without analysis that "polygraph evidence presents no legitimate
hearsay concerns," with sole supporting citation to Imwinkelried & McCall, supra).
81. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
82. FED. R. EVID. 802. See, for example, California Evidence Code § 1200, for a representative
state rule.
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justice system.
A defendant's out-of-court statement to a witness that he did not commit
the charged crime is a classic example of inadmissible hearsay. As a general
matter such evidence, when offered by the defense,83 falls squarely within the
hearsay prohibition and cannot be admitted under any hearsay exception.84 This
prohibition similarly applies when the defendant (or any witness) makes an out-
of-court statement to a lie detector expert. The expert's in-court repetition of the
test subject's out-of-court statement is hearsay and inadmissible. 85 As the
expert's opinion is only relevant to establish the potential truth of the subject's
answers, the hearsay bar to revealing those answers to the jury renders the lie
detector expert's testimony irrelevant and inadmissible.
A simple example illustrates the depth of the problem. Imagine that an
arson defendant honestly answers "no" to the dispositive question-"Did you set
fire to the Scenic Vista Housing Complex?"-during an fMRI examination.8 6
The expert fMRI examiner determines that the defendant's statement appears to
be truthful. Apart from some background testimony regarding fMRI technology,
the expert's proposed testimony would consist of the expert's repetition of the
defendant's out-of-court assertion of innocence and an opinion that the
statement appears to be true. This testimony is relevant because the jury could
then decide to credit the out-of-court statement (i.e., to accept it as true) in light
of the expert's testimony.
83. One type of lie detector evidence would not be subject to a hearsay objection. The
prosecution can introduce the results of a lie detector examination taken by the defendant because the
defendant's statements during the examination would constitute statements of a party opponent. See
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (stating that admissions made by party opponent, introduced by opposing
party are nonhearsay and admissible under rules of evidence); cf United States v. Waters, 194 F.3d
926, 931 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that statements made by defendant during lie detector examination
were inadmissible hearsay because defense, rather than prosecution, sought to introduce them).
Despite the colloquial reference to the pertinent hearsay exception as "admissions" of a party
opponent, there is no actual requirement that the statements constitute admissions; under Rule
801(d)(2), a statement is not considered hearsay if "[t]he statement is offered against a party and is...
the party's own statement." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). Of course, a defendant cannot be compelled to
take a lie detector test. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (referencing lie detector
tests as type of invasion that would "evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment" and
suggesting that such testing may not be compelled).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Chard, 115 F.3d 631, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1997) (ruling that defendant's
exculpatory statements to police officer were inadmissible hearsay). See infra note 105 for cases
excluding polygraph evidence of prior consistent statements.
85. See United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975) (listing "hearsay" as one of
several grounds on which polygraph evidence will properly be excluded); United States v. Ridling, 350
F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (noting that "the [subject's] statements supported by the opinion of
the [lie detector] expert appear to be hearsay"); Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 753 N.E.2d 649, 653 (Ind. 2001)
(excluding lie detector evidence as inadmissible hearsay); cf Waters, 194 F.3d at 931 (upholding under
Rule 403 district court's exclusion of polygraph evidence without Daubert hearing, and adding that
refusal to independently admit defendant's responses in polygraph examination was also proper
because "'[s]uch statements, when offered by the defendant, are hearsay, except in narrow
circumstances not present here"' (quoting United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793,798 (8th Cir. 1993))).
86. An actual lie detector examination would be significantly more comprehensive. A simplified
version is used here solely to illustrate the hearsay problem.
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The fMRI expert's presentation, as with any coherent presentation of lie
detector testimony, thus requires the expert to explicitly inform or, at least,
implicitly reveal the relevant questions and answers included in the
examination-here, the defendant's critical assertion that he did not set fire to
the Scenic Vista Housing Complex. As a consequence, the fMRI expert's
testimony will include a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing,"8 7 thus satisfying the first portion of the hearsay
definition.
It is equally clear that the defendant's out-of-court statement is "offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" 8 8-- the second and final
portion of the hearsay definition. In fact, not only is the defendant's statement
during the lie detector examination offered for its truth, but in introducing the
statement through what is essentially a "truth expert," the defense attempts to
establish its substantive truth in two separate ways. First, in traditional fashion,
the defendant's assertion concerning a fact at issue is presented to the jury. As
the defendant's assertion is only relevant for its potential truth, this statement,
like virtually all witness testimony, is offered by its proponent for that purpose.
Second, the statement is presented as true in a more novel way, through expert
opinion testimony that an application of lie detection technology supports a
conclusion that the statement is truthful. In essence, the statement is offered as
substantive evidence, and then because the truth of the statement is in doubt, the
defense supports the inference that the statement is substantively true with
expert testimony.
The fact that the lie detector subject's (in this case the defendant's) out-of-
court statement is offered for its truth is further apparent from the fact that if
offered for any other purpose, the statement has no relevance. A statement is not
offered for its truth "[i]f the significance of [the] offered statement lies solely in
the fact that it was made."89 In such circumstances, "no issue is raised as to the
truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay."
90
In the instant example, there certainly is an issue raised as to the truth of
the defendant's out-of-court assertion of innocence-in fact, that "issue" is both
the underlying purpose for offering the statement and the sole reason for the
fMRI expert opinion testimony to follow. Conversely, there is absolutely no
significance to the fact that the defendant made an out-of-court statement
professing his innocence. A denial of guilt can, in fact, be presumed by virtue of
the trial proceedings. The assertion of innocence assumes significance if, and
87. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
88. Id.
89. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note.
90. Id.; accord United States v. Cantu, 876 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1989) ("If the significance of
a statement 'lies solely in the fact that it was made,' rather than in the veracity of the out-of-court
declarant's assertion, the statement is not hearsay because it is not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note)); cf Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying as
to what he has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements.").
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only if, it is believed (i.e., the statement is credited as true or possibly true).91
In light of this hearsay problem, a party may be tempted to try to offer lie
detector testimony in a fashion that obscures the underlying hearsay statements
(e.g., the testimony of an expert that a lie detector subject "passed" a lie detector
test). Evidence consisting solely of generic expert statements regarding positive
test results that omits the actual questions asked and answers given, however,
would properly be excluded as irrelevant under Rule 402 or impermissibly
misleading and confusing under Rule 403.92 A jury cannot evaluate the
significance, if any, of expert testimony that a witness spoke truthfully, if it does
not know what the witness said. Finally, to the extent generic testimony
regarding lie detector test passage is arguably relevant to a lie detector subject's
overall character for truthfulness, it is precluded by Federal Rule of Evidence
608 which strictly limits admission of "evidence of truthful character" and bars
altogether introduction of "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness" for
the "purpose of. .. supporting the witness'[s] character for truthfulness. '" 93
B. Neither Federal Rule of Evidence 703 nor the Availability of the Lie Detector
Subject for Cross-Examination at Trial Solves the Hearsay Problem
To emphasize the sweeping power of a hearsay objection to unequivocally
preclude the introduction of lie detector evidence, it is necessary to discredit two
facially appealing, but ultimately unfruitful, avenues around the hearsay
problem. As discussed below, neither Federal Rule of Evidence 703, nor the
availability of the lie detector subject at trial, eliminate the hearsay problem
inherent in lie detector evidence.
91. There is, perhaps, one exception-a scenario in which the defendant believes his exculpatory
statement to be true but has limited knowledge of the circumstances such that the statement is
relevant only to consciousness of innocence rather than actual innocence (e.g., the defendant was
insane or unconscious at the time of the crime, or has suffered memory-jeopardizing trauma since the
crime). This scenario is, of course, exceedingly rare. In the vast majority of cases, no meaningful
distinction exists between considering a defendant's own statement that he is innocent as evidence that
he is "conscious" of innocence and considering it as evidence that he is, in fact, innocent. Cf United
States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting for purposes of Rule 704(b) analysis that
"[t]here is no principled distinction ... between the testimony of [the defendant's] polygraph expert
regarding her physiological responses to the questions posed during the examination and the
conclusion from that testimony that she did not 'know' that the van contained a significant amount of
marijuana").
92. See infra note 126 for sources discussing exclusion of lie detector evidence due to a
determination that it is misleading, irrelevant, or unhelpful.
93. FED. R. EVID. 608(a)-(b). Lie detector evidence is not otherwise precluded by Rule 608,
which covers only "evidence of truthful character" and evidence of "[s]pecific instances of the conduct
of a witness" offered "for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness'[s] character for
truthfulness." Id. (emphasis added). Lie detector evidence, properly offered, does not speak to the
character of the witness for truthfulness and may even be offered where the witness does not testify in
court. Rather the lie detector evidence is offered to prove the truth of the particular statements made
during the test. Cf. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246,252 n.8 (C.M.A. 1987) (finding that admission
of lie detector evidence does not violate Military Rule of Evidence 608), superseded by MIL. R. EVID.
707, as recognized in United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), rev'd, 523 U.S.
303 (1998).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits the disclosure of otherwise
inadmissible evidence to the jury if the evidence constitutes the "facts or data...
upon which an expert bases an opinion." 94 Under this Rule, a proponent of lie
detector evidence could plausibly try to introduce the underlying subject's
statements in a lie detector examination as the "data upon which" the lie
detector expert based her opinion. In theory, then, Rule 703 permits this
otherwise inadmissible hearsay to be placed before the jury as part of the
presentation of the expert's opinion. 95
Rule 703, however, does not avoid the hearsay problem inherent in lie
detector testimony because of the limited, nonsubstantive purpose for which
evidence admitted under the Rule can be used. In the case of expert lie detector
testimony, a hearsay problem arises because the expert's testimony is relevant
solely to inform the jury's consideration of the substantive truth of a lie detector
subject's out-of-court statement. Consequently, the hearsay problem can only be
solved by a hearsay exception that permits substantive consideration of the out-
of-court statements. Rule 703 does not permit such consideration. 96
As the drafters of Rule 703 made clear, evidence admitted under the Rule
cannot "be used for substantive purposes." 97 Instead, "data" admitted under
Rule 703 (here, the lie detector subject's statements) comes in solely to assist the
jury to evaluate the credibility of the expert opinion.98 The jury cannot consider
it as substantive evidence. 99 Therefore, if a lie detector subject's statements were
admitted through Rule 703, the jury would be precluded from considering those
94. FED. R. EvID. 703.
95. See Imwinkelried & McCall, supra note 80, at 1072-73 (emphasizing that Rule 703 allows a lie
detector expert to base an opinion on inadmissible hearsay, so long as hearsay is "'of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions"' (quoting FED. R. EVID. 703)).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note on 2000 amendment (requiring trial judge
to instruct jury that evidence is not admitted for its substantive truth but only for its effect on expert's
opinion). The Rule, as amended in 2000, further instructs district courts that "[flacts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible" should not even be "disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion...
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
97. Id. The Rule's drafters note that when evidence is disclosed to the jury under Rule 703, "the
trial judge must give a limiting instruction upon request, informing the jury that the underlying
information must not be used for substantive purposes." Id. This point was made explicit in notes to
the 2000 amendments, but the principle applied to the pre-2000 rule. See Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible
Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 583, 584 (1987) (advocating that juries should be permitted to consider data underlying expert
opinion for substantive purposes, but acknowledging that Rule 703 does not permit such
consideration); cf. United States v. A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1135 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
that expert's analysis of inadmissible lie detector evidence underlying his opinion as to mental capacity
of witness was admissible under Rule 703 but only with respect to credibility of expert's opinion not
with respect to credibility of lie detector subject).
98. FED. R. EViD. 703.
99. See FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note on 2000 amendment (noting that if
otherwise inadmissible evidence is admitted, judge should give jury limiting instruction not to use
evidence for substantive purposes).
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statements for their truth (and would be so instructed). 1°° The lie detector
expert's testimony that the statements are true would consequently be irrelevant
and properly stricken. In other words, to the extent Rule 703 "solves" the
hearsay problem, an unintended side effect of the solution is that the expert's
testimony is rendered irrelevant and thus inadmissible under other rules of
evidence.
Lie detector evidence also remains objectionable as hearsay even if the
subject of the lie detector examination testifies in court. 10 1 While it can be argued
that once the subject repeats the out-of-court statements at trial, the out-of-court
statements become relevant for a nonsubstantive purpose-to corroborate the
in-court statements-this argument is also barred by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 02 Federal Rule 801(d) permits a party to introduce a prior consistent
statement of a testifying witness as nonhearsay only if the statement is
"consistent with the [witness's] testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge ...of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." 10 3
Outside of this narrow scenario, 0 4 the prior consistent statements of a witness,
whether made during a lie detector examination or elsewhere, are
inadmissible. 05
100. Id.
101. Perhaps this dilemma could be resolved if the witness testified in court while simultaneously
undergoing a lie detector examination. In such circumstances the witness's underlying statements are
not made out of court and consequently are not hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as
statement that is not made while testifying at trial or hearing). As there is no precedent for such a
procedure, however, it is unlikely to be a practical means of solving the hearsay problem.
102. In fact, the argument itself is somewhat flawed. The out-of-court statement is still being
offered for its truth, just indirectly. The proponent of the out-of-court lie detector evidence is
attempting to prove that the in-court testimony is true based on an inference (bolstered by expert
testimony) that the out-of-court statement is true.
103. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (emphasis added).
104. A prior consistent statement is not admissible any time a witness's testimony is challenged
as fabricated but rather only in the much narrower circumstance where the prior consistent statement
predated "the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Tome v. United States,
513 U.S. 150,167 (1995).
105. See United States v. McCulley, 178 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1999) ("It is, of course, improper
to admit a previous statement for the mere purpose of bolstering a statement made at trial."); United
States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1144 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding it improper to admit prior statements solely
to strengthen credibility of statements made at trial); United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 517 (4th Cir.
1995) ("The testimony as to [the declarant's] out-of-court statement to [the police officer] was
admitted solely to corroborate what [the declarant] testified to 'in the courtroom today.' A prior
consistent out-of-court statement of a witness is not admissible for this purpose."); United States v. A
& S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1135 n.6 (4th Cir. 1991) ("It was improper for the government to
introduce an extrajudicial statement, consistent with [the witness's] trial testimony, except 'to rebut an
expressed or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive."' (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B))); United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 & n.2 (4th
Cir. 1977) ("Corroborative testimony consisting of prior, consistent statements is ordinarily
inadmissible" as hearsay absent conditions set forth in Rule 801(d)(1)(B)); United States v. Navarro-
Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that district court properly excluded defendant's
tape-recorded statement that was consistent with trial testimony on grounds that prosecution had not
attacked defendant's in-court testimony as recent fabrication).
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In sum, lie detector evidence depends on its underlying hearsay component
for its relevance and, consequently, any effort to finesse or obscure the hearsay
component renders the evidence either irrelevant or impermissible character
evidence. There is no middle ground. At most, an artful attorney might be able
to disguise the hearsay imbedded within the lie detector evidence, but the fact
that the hearsay is implicit, rather than explicit, would not make it any less
objectionable. "If the substance of the prohibited [hearsay] testimony is evident
even though it was not introduced in the prohibited form, the testimony is still
inadmissible."10 6 Consequently, the search for a reliable lie detector will
ultimately be of no consequence to the criminal justice system absent an
applicable hearsay exception. 0 7
C. Lie Detector Evidence Under the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rules
One potential solution to lie detector evidence's inherent hearsay problem
is the "residual exception" to the hearsay rules found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 807. Rule 807 provides that a statement not specifically covered by the
exceptions to the hearsay doctrine that has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" may be admitted if:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence.108
The residual exception is "designed to encourage the progressive growth
and development of federal evidentiary law by giving courts the flexibility to
deal with new evidentiary situations which may not be pigeon-holed
elsewhere."'1 9 One "new evidentiary situation" potentially well suited to the
106. Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Foster v. State, 687 S.W.2d 829,
832 (Ark. 1985) ("The mere mention of the [polygraph] test, under the circumstances, makes obvious
its results, which is [sic] inadmissible hearsay.").
107. Of course, even if lie detector evidence is inadmissible in court it will continue to be used
informally outside of court by police and prosecutors in evaluating witnesses, and by defendants
attempting to convince police and prosecutors of their innocence. In fact, it is plausible that if lie
detector science were someday perfected, but nevertheless remained inadmissible in court, pretrial lie
detector examinations would become more significant than trials for proving defendants' innocence
and trials would occur only for those defendants who refused to participate in, or failed, pretrial lie
detector examinations.
108. FED. R. EvID. 807. The Rule also requires that the offering party provide notice of its intent
to offer any statements in advance of trial. Id.
109. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1977); see also SEC v. First City Fin.
Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("When a statement is not specifically exempted from the
general hearsay prohibition, [the residual exception] allows the introduction of the statement if it is
invested with 'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,' is more probative than other
evidence that the proponent can reasonably procure, and serves the interests of justice."); Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that residual exception allows for judicial
discretion).
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exception is the introduction of out-of-court statements whose substantive truth
has been verified by scientifically valid lie detection techniques. 1 0
The Rule 807 analysis is fairly straightforward. Assuming that proffered lie
detector evidence satisfies Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s1"
threshold requirements for scientific validity, the three delineated requirements
of Rule 807 will generally be satisfied. The materiality requirement is simply a
"'restatement of the general requirement that evidence must be relevant"'-a
threshold that must already be met under Daubert itself and as a general matter
under Rule 402.112 The necessity requirement-that the statement be more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other reasonably
obtainable evidence-is also readily met as the underlying subject's statements
during a lie detector examination cannot be duplicated by other evidence, and
without these statements, the lie detector evidence cannot be presented. 113 The
equity requirement should also be satisfied given the professed desire of the
rules and the criminal justice system generally to provide the jury with all
significant relevant evidence from which to determine guilt or innocence. 114
Admission of lie detector evidence over this evidentiary hurdle is particularly
warranted when such evidence is presented by the defense in light of the general
constitutional requirement that the accused be permitted to present significant
exculpatory evidence. 1 5
110. Among the commentators and courts to have addressed this issue there appears to be only
one instance in which the residual exception was recognized as a potential solution to the hearsay
problem-although at a time when the scientific reliability of the lie detector evidence may not have
warranted it. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (noting that "the
statements supported by the opinion of the expert appear to be hearsay but since the very purpose of
the test is to determine truthfulness, the evidence should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule because of its high degree of trustworthiness" (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (current version at
FED. R. EVID. 807)).
111. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
112. United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 892 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting CHARLES TILFORD
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 324 (5th ed. 2003)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 42 (2006); see
also FED. R. EVID. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence").
113. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for the conclusion that the relevance of lie
detector evidence depends on the underlying statements made during the polygraph examination.
114. See FED. R. EvID. 402 (requiring as starting point for evidentiary analysis that "[a]ll relevant
evidence is admissible"); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88 (recognizing "'liberal thrust' of the Federal
Rules" and that "basic standard of relevance" under the Rules "is a liberal one" (quoting Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54 (1987) ("'[Tlhe
truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent
understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury ... ' (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 22 (1967) (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)))); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.
325, 333 (1983) ("'[TIthe paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and
unobstructed as possible."' (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860))).
115. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (recognizing defendant's constitutional
right "to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt"); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (reversing conviction where reliable exculpatory evidence was
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The key question under Rule 807 is whether the statements made by a
subject during a lie detector test include "guarantees of trustworthiness" that are
"equivalent" to those required under the other hearsay exceptions in the rules. 116
As a starting point, it must be recognized that courts have generally, and
properly, precluded defendants from introducing their own out-of-court
exculpatory statements under the residual exception to the hearsay rules. Where
the defendant simply attempts to introduce his own exculpatory assertions while
avoiding cross-examination, the prohibition against hearsay applies with full
force, and the evidence is properly excluded. 17
The analysis is altered, however, when a defendant's out-of-court
exculpatory statement (or another witness's out-of-court statement) arises in the
context of a scientifically valid application of lie detector technology. This is
because a validation of truthfulness by a reliable lie detector test provides a
strong "circumstantial guarantee[] of trustworthiness" ' 1 8 arguably equivalent to
any of those contained in the Federal Rules. In fact, the Supreme Court has itself
recognized the parallels between Rule 702's requirement of scientific validity
and the trustworthiness required generally under the existing hearsay
exceptions. 119
The mere fact that a witness's out-of-court statement is validated by a
reliable lie detector test, however, will likely still be insufficient to provide the
necessary "guarantees of trustworthiness" under Rule 807. The unique
susceptibility of lie detector evidence to manipulation and the numerous
alternate grounds for rejection of such evidence will require a proponent of lie
detector evidence to take further steps to maximize the trustworthiness of a
submission before it is admitted in court.
excluded as hearsay, and emphasizing that "the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
defeat the ends of justice").
116. FED. R. EvID. 807. Significantly, the Rule does not require that the proffered evidence has
the same guarantees of trustworthiness required in other rules but rather equivalent guarantees, i.e.,
guarantees that are of equal strength as those found in other rules.
117. See United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1460(7th Cir. 1993) (affirming exclusion of
exculpatory statements defendant made to his attorney because such statements lack "guarantees of
trustworthiness" required for admission under residual hearsay exception); United States v. Ferri, 778
F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that there was no abuse of discretion in district court's exclusion
of defendant's exculpatory statement made after he was aware grand jury subpoenaed him to testify in
its investigation); United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming exclusion of
exculpatory statements defendant made to government informant because defendant knew he was
under investigation at time he made statements and consequently it "was not trustworthy" as required
for residual hearsay exception).
118. FED. R. EvID. 807.
119. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 n.9 (emphasizing that Rule 702 analysis is aimed at determining
"evidentiary reliability-that is, trustworthiness" and citing statement in drafters' notes to the Federal
Rules of Evidence that "hearsay exceptions will be recognized only 'under circumstances supposed to
furnish guarantees of trustworthiness"' for proposition that reliability and trustworthiness are similar
concepts (quoting FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note)).
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D. Increasing the "Trustworthiness" of Lie Detector Evidence to Enable Its
Admission Under Rules 807 and 403
District courts are likely to exercise their obligation to ensure adequate
circumstantial "guarantees of trustworthiness" under Rule 807 and, to a lesser
extent, that evidence not be impermissibly misleading under Rule 403, by
excluding even scientifically valid lie detector evidence whenever the lie detector
examination at issue has been administered in a questionable manner.120 One
factor in particular will be of primary significance-the provision of advance
notice and some opportunity to participate in the lie detector examination to the
opposing party. In fact, the case law dealing with traditional polygraph evidence
indicates that this factor is of such importance that sufficient notice, at least, may
constitute a de facto requirement for the admission of lie detector evidence.
Courts have consistently frowned on "unilaterally" procured lie detector
evidence that is, after a favorable result, proffered to the court for admission.'
21
The courts point out that the secrecy of the offering party's conduct in obtaining
the evidence undermines reliability by suggesting that the party was uncertain as
to whether the test results would be favorable and by introducing an element of
uncertainty regarding the fairness of the underlying test conditions.
2 2
Particularly in evaluating exculpatory lie detector test results submitted by
the defense, a court will consider the fact that the defendant, acting unilaterally,
had nothing to lose in taking a lie detector test; if the defendant failed, there was
120. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring showing, prior to admission of expert testimony, that
expert "has applied the [applicable] principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case").
121. See United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) ("We have repeatedly held
that 'unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible .... ' (quoting United States
v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216 (6th Cir. 1995))).
122. See United States v. Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 2005) (labeling "privately
commissioned" "eleventh hour" test administered "without notice to the government" as "highly
suspect" and noting that "courts have routinely rejected unilateral and clandestine polygraph
examinations"); Thomas, 167 F.3d at 309 (explaining unreliability of results where test was conducted
without notice to government and lacked other procedural safeguards); United States v. Gilliard, 133
F.3d 809, 816 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Although a party is not required to give an adverse party advance
notice of, and the opportunity to be present at, a polygraph examination, the absence of such notice
and opportunity may be a factor in determining whether admission of the polygraph evidence would
unduly prejudice the adverse party."), United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996)
(noting that fact that polygraph examination was "administered by an expert selected by the defense
apparently without the participation of the government" was factor that "weighs most heavily against
[its] admission"); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that defendant's
"privately commissioned polygraph test, which was unknown to the government until after its
completion, is of extremely dubious probative value"); United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758,
767 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding "eleventh hour, secret [lie detector] examination" to be properly
excluded); Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 589 (D. Conn. 1996) (noting that opposing party was
"neither contacted before the exam nor invited to participate" in lie detector examination and
"[t]herefore. the potential for prejudice is great"); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354,
1365 (D. Ariz. 1995) (conditioning admissibility of lie detector evidence on defendant "provid[ing]
sufficient notice to the government" and granting it "a reasonable opportunity to have its own
competent examiner administer a polygraph examination which is materially similar to the previously
taken examination").
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no obligation to turn the results over to the prosecutor. 123 Conversely, once the
defendant passes the test, he enjoys the windfall of what appears to be, in
hindsight, a misleadingly powerful piece of exculpatory evidence.
124
By contrast, when the proponent of lie detector evidence demonstrates that
the opposing party received an opportunity to observe and participate in the lie
detector examination, the trustworthiness of the resulting examination is greatly
increased. Assuming later admissibility of the test results, "both parties have a
risk in the outcome of the polygraph examination, simultaneously reducing the
possibility of unfair prejudice and increasing reliability.'1 2 5
The opportunity for both parties to suggest or clarify the questions to be
asked of the lie detector subject will also increase the trustworthiness of the
examination, eliminating the potential for strategic use of subtly misleading
questions to skew the probative value of the test. The most trustworthy test will
be composed of generally open-ended questions (e.g., "what happened that
night?") that unambiguously shed light on the disputed issues. Such questions
are especially significant because the nature of an out-of-court lie detector
examination precludes later (lie-detector aided) expansion on, or cross-
examination of, the answers given. Consequently, courts may exclude questions
or answers that fail to shed significant light on the disputed issue as misleading,
irrelevant, or unhelpful under Rules 402, 403, or 702.126 The opponent of
123. See Ross, 412 F.3d at 773 (reasoning that unilateral test commissioned by defense is suspect
"because it carries no negative consequences, and probably won't see the light of day if a defendant
flunks"); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 810 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that if defendants had taken
lie detector test and results were unfavorable, "the results would not have been revealed"); Feldman,
711 F.2d at 767 (finding that "eleventh hour, secret nature of [lie detector] examination" rendered it
"'particularly unreliable since the examinee knows that if he "fails" the test his counsel will not submit
the results to the Government' (quoting United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1136 (N.D. Ill.
1981))). There is even authority to suggest that the prosecution in certain circumstances would have no
obligation to reveal that a witness failed a lie detector test, although it is unclear how this precedent
would apply to scientifically valid (i.e., potentially admissible) lie detector evidence. See Wood v.
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (holding that state's failure to reveal that prosecution witness failed
polygraph test did not require reversal of conviction under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
because test results were inadmissible under state law and thus would not have changed outcome of
trial).
124. In fact, not knowing that the results of any failed tests could be hidden, the jury might
interpret the defendant's mere willingness to take the test as an exonerating factor. Cf Murphy v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that evidence of willingness of plaintiff
in civil litigation to take lie detector test was admissible because it "reflected upon his credibility").
125. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 430-31, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that "[w]ell
before the tests were given, counsel for the defendants contacted the prosecution and extended the
opportunity to participate in the tests" and "offered to stipulate that the results would be admissible in
any way the government wanted to use them" in reversing district court's categorical exclusion of lie
detector evidence).
126. See United States v. Jordan, 150 F.3d 895,900 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding no abuse of discretion
in excluding lie detector evidence under Rule 403 where witness took initial polygraph test that
indicated deception but did not take second test that would have clarified reasons for failing first
exam); United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no abuse of discretion in
excluding evidence that prosecution witness failed polygraph test regarding "peripheral details" about
crime where defense rejected prosecution's proposal to retest witness asking questions that went "to
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proffered lie detector evidence will be unable to object, however, that the
examiner's questions are ambiguous or misleading if there was an adequate
opportunity for both sides to submit or object to those questions prior to the
examination.
If a party does not give advance notice to its adversary, a district court could
also be justifiably suspicious that the subject had either "practiced" by
repeatedly taking lie detector tests prior to the successful test or failed similar
tests on other occasions, rendering the one successful test misleading. Even when
notice is given, a proponent of lie detector evidence may still need to allay this
suspicion, perhaps through an affidavit by counsel included with the initial
evidentiary proffer regarding the number of times the witness has taken lie
detector tests and the results of those tests.127
In sum, the trustworthiness of any lie detector evidence can be enhanced (or
undermined) by the circumstances surrounding the administration of the test. By
giving one's opponent notice and an opportunity to participate in the lie detector
examination and by declaring that the witness has not taken (and failed) other lie
detector tests, the proponent of expert testimony regarding that examination will
be in the strongest position to argue that the evidence satisfies the
trustworthiness and reliability requirements of the applicable Federal Rules of
Evidence, particularly the residual hearsay exception of Rule 807. In
combination with an adequate showing under Daubert of the scientific validity of
the lie detection technique utilized, this demonstration of trustworthiness may be
sufficient to establish admissibility. 12 Perhaps more significantly, any submission
the heart of the matter"); Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1515 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding lie detector evidence because questions asked were largely irrelevant); United
States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that where first two questions asked by
polygraph examiner were "inherently ambiguous" and third question obscured relevance of answer by
asking question in form of "do you know for sure," district court did not abuse its discretion to exclude
polygraph evidence as substantially more likely to mislead jury than probative); United States v.
Redschlag, 971 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (D. Colo. 1997) ("Where a question is ambiguous, the results of the
polygraph examination as to that question need not be admitted."); Meyers, 947 F. Supp. at 589 (citing
ambiguity in questions and answers as reason for excluding polygraph evidence); cf. United States v.
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 170 n.17 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that if lie detector evidence ever becomes
scientifically reliable, "it would be advisable for the trial judge to undertake an active role in directing
and controlling the taking of the examination").
127. In making the proffer, a proponent of lie detector evidence may also benefit from
highlighting evidence, if any, that corroborates the declarant's version of events. See United States v.
Black, 684 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding no abuse of discretion in rejection of lie detector
evidence where district court "was understandably skeptical of [the defendant's] polygraph results,
particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence demonstrating [his] guilt"). The proponent of a lie
detector test may also increase the trustworthiness of the underlying declarant's statements by making
the declarant available to testify at trial and thus ultimately subject to cross-examination. Cf. United
States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 892 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that child witness's testimony at trial
supported admission of unsworn out-of-court statements under Rule 807), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 42
(2006).
128. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause imposes additional limitations on the
prosecution's ability to introduce hearsay testimony against a defendant. Specifically, in this context,
the Sixth Amendment would presumably prohibit the admission of lie detector evidence of a
nontestifying confidential informant. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where
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that comes up short of these requirements will likely be rejected under the
Federal Rules.
IV. CONCLUSION: LIE DETECTOR EVIDENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
Few would disagree with the judgment of this country's founders that trial
by jury is a superior means of protecting the citizenry from the tyranny of the
political classes. 129 Nevertheless, the jury trial is a blunt instrument for achieving
its ultimate objective of discerning the truth (i.e., what really happened).1 30 The
unfortunate fact is that jurors have no way of knowing, apart from collective
intuition, which of the handful of persons who actually do know what happened
is credible. Further, the defendant who best knows the answer to the key
question of guilt or innocence remains a largely untapped source of truth.
Defendants commonly do not testify, 131 and even when they do, juries are
understandably hesitant to rely on their testimony as it is infused with an obvious
bias.132
A scientifically valid lie detector could significantly enhance the jury's
ability to determine the credibility of witnesses and consequently improve its
ability to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. Indeed, as Dean Wigmore
testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."). The Sixth Amendment prohibition
would not, however, prevent the prosecution from submitting lie detector evidence as a supplement to
the informant's trial testimony. Id. at 60 n.9 ("[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements." (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,162 (1970))).
129. The jury trial right was intended "'to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the
part of rulers,' and 'was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the
great bulwark of their civil and political liberties."' United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-11
(1995) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
541 n.2 (4th ed. 1873)); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (emphasizing
importance of jury trial).
130. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 578, 707 (1997)
(noting that "most of the evidence we have suggests that juries have no particular talent for spotting
lies" and that "Itihere is little evidence that regular people do much better than chance at separating
truth from lies"); Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1297, 1298 (2000) (highlighting "increasing evidence that the number of innocent defendants
who end up convicted is unacceptably large").
131. See Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a
New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 950-51 (2002) (summarizing studies dating back
to 1920s and concluding that "with increasing frequency defendants are not taking the stand at trial as
they once did" and "the extent of refusals to testify varies from one-third to well over one-half [of
defendants] in some jurisdictions").
132. See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Nothing could be more
obvious, and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's profound interest in the verdict.");
Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don't: Jurors' Reaction
to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 60, 66 (2005) (reporting
results of juror interviews that showed that jurors generally viewed defendant testimony as
untrustworthy); James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies,
Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1313 (1992) ("A testifying defendant's credibility is
impeached by his interest in the trial's outcome even before he utters a word.").
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stated more than fifty years ago, "'If there is ever devised a psychological test for
the valuation of witnesses, the law will run to meet it.' ' 133 In light of the hearsay
problem inherent in lie detector evidence, however, the opening for admissibility
of such evidence under the Federal Rules is a narrow one. In fact, a simple
hearsay objection appears to exclude, at the very least, one form of scientifically
valid lie detector evidence that likely would otherwise have been most
pervasive-unilaterally obtained exculpatory lie detector results submitted on
behalf of a criminal defendant. As explained above, such evidence, even when
based on valid science, is objectionable hearsay and, due to its clandestine
procurement, will likely be deemed insufficiently trustworthy for admission
under the residual exception to the hearsay rules.
It is, then, only a small subset of defendants who stand to benefit from
advances in lie detection science-those who are sufficiently confident in their
actual innocence (and, of course, the reliability of the applicable lie detector
technology to be utilized) that they will provide the requisite notice to the
prosecution of a proposed lie detector examination, thus risking the use of
negative results against them. 134 Nevertheless, this benefit is by no means
insignificant; after all, "concern about the injustice that results from the
conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice
system."' 135
In sum, proper application of the Federal Rules of Evidence should lead, at
most, to admissibility in only very narrow circumstances of even scientifically
valid lie detector evidence. Despite a determination of scientific validity under
Rule 702, courts will properly insist that any lie detector evidence presented to
the jury satisfy the prerequisites for admissibility established for all evidence by
the other Federal Rules of Evidence. Nevertheless, when a scientifically valid lie
detector has been applied in a manner that maximizes the trustworthiness of its
133. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1923)). In a more recent, related pronouncement,
the Eight Circuit stated that:
If we were satisfied in our own minds about the scientific reliability of polygraph tests and
the integrity and responsibility of the examiners to the extent of an almost unimpeachable
result, we would eagerly acknowledge the reliability of the machine and embrace its use in
court proceedings in the absence of stipulation by the parties.
Id.; cf. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (quoting nineteenth-century treatise for
proposition that "[a] means of ensuring the truth in human testimony has been a thing desired in every
age" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In contrast, Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has
expressed "doubt that the uneasiness about electrical lie detectors would disappear even if they were
refined to place their accuracy beyond question. Indeed, I would not be surprised if such a
development would only heighten the sense of unease and the search for plausible legal objections."
State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 235 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J., concurring).
134. A similar cost-benefit analysis will be required in considering a lie detector examination for
other key defense (and prosecution) witnesses. Only a party sufficiently confident in the veracity of a
cooperating witness will risk procuring evidence that could have the effect of undermining its own
case. The proper tactical considerations for defense counsel in these situations, and the prosecutor's
respective obligations as an advocate not only for conviction but also for justice, will likely be the
subject of great debate.
135. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,325 (1995).
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results, courts appear obligated under the Federal Rules to permit a lie detector
expert to assist the jury in determining the credibility of key witnesses and
perhaps render more accurate the jury's ultimate conclusion as to the
defendant's guilt.
